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Whilst Brexit is by no stretch of the imagination “done“, the framework 
within which the UK’s new relationship with its nearest and most 
important neighbour will evolve over the next few years is now set. I 
fully expect to see substantial changes in the medium term, probably 
from the mid-2020s onwards but for now there is at least a degree of 
clarity. 
There will, of course, be ample time to reflect on what comes next and 
to cogitate upon what the short, medium and longer-term ramifications 
of Brexit are, once more data become available. Here, however, I’d 
like to take the opportunity to look back rather than forward. 
In particular, I want to return to the fateful referendum result and the 
period leading up to it. So much of the rhetoric around Brexit is 
couched in hindsight, which is inevitably 20/20. Moreover, in general 
those with a proclivity to vote remain rather than leave are much more 
vocal. Those “leavers” who do speak out are – probably inevitably – 
atypical. 
This is frustrating. There is a great deal of rhetoric suggesting that 
Britain was never “truly committed” to the “European project”, with opt-
outs from Maastricht given as evidence. Similarly, “De Gaulle was 
right” is widely asserted. 
Frankly, that’s hogwash. It is certainly true that the 
UK government had deep reservations about many of the changes 
the Maastricht treaty brought (notably around the social chapter). It’s 
also true that many people in the UK were deeply sceptical about 
treaty changes and “ever closer union”. 
They were hardly unusual in that regard. Referenda in Europe have 
seen treaty changes rejected multiple times. Who can forget the 
debacle of the failed EU constitution in 2005? It was not British voters 
who delivered the coup de grace but those ardent Europeans – the 
French. 
Look back prior to the 2016 referendum and this scepticism was the 
rule rather than the exception. From the perspective of 2021, that 
seems impossible. After all, polls overwhelmingly show that no EU 
nation wants to follow the UK out of the bloc and a majority of British 
voters now clearly view Brexit as a mistake. 
How quickly we forget: by the middle of the last decade, British voters 
did appear amongst the most Eurosceptic in the EU, but were far from 
outliers in this regard. It is by no means guaranteed that had 
referenda been held elsewhere that the results would have differed 
from the British one. 
Moreover, whilst in geopolitical terms there is a huge gulf in outcome 
between a 52-48 result one way and a 48-52 result the other, in terms 
of the “popularity” of EU membership from the perspective of a 
population the difference is minimal. A situation in which over 40% of 
a country’s populace vote to leave is hardly a ringing endorsement! 
This is not to criticise the EU: national leaders all-too-frequently use 
European legislation as an excuse for having to take unpopular 
actions and regularly bash the bloc. The British were amongst the 
worst, but were hardly the only ones to do so. The lesson here is that 
the UK is not exceptional. It sits towards one end of a spectrum, but 
this notion of British (or, indeed, English) exceptionalism needs to be 
rejected and that applies both to those who think the UK is uniquely 
great and to those who single out its population as uniquely “bad 
Europeans”. 
Which brings me rather neatly onto another fallacious argument that I 
hear all-too-regularly: that Brexit is a result of imperial nostalgia. This 
is palpable nonsense and it is telling that nostalgia for Empire is 
almost never raised by “leavers” themselves. Indeed, it is 
overwhelmingly “remainers” who express concern over the UK’s place 
in the world. 
The fallacy here is to conflate those in government (who are 
unrepresentative of the typical leave-voter) with the people who voted. 
The UK’s political leaders do, indeed, regularly invoke the language of 
Empire, talking of a “buccaneering” Britannia who implicitly rules the 
waves. Whether this is genuine or affected, I cannot say. 
What I can assert with more confidence is that this is not typical of the 
average “leave” voter. The British Empire is a purely abstract notion to 
the typical leave voter. Whilst we might be lamentably ignorant about 
its crimes, military adventurism is extremely unpopular post-Iraq and 
most would recoil at the notion of taking over a territory and refusing 
its inhabitants a vote on how it is run. 
Again, whilst they might express admiration at perceived past 
“achievements”, Empire does not intrude on the everyday thoughts of 
your average leave voter. And why should it? Like most, they are 
concerned with making ends meet, healthcare, education and other 
priorities. 
Leave voters are, on average, less likely to have attended university 
and more likely to be in a poorer socio-economic group than remain 
voters. They are hardly the beneficiaries of the plunder of an empire 
that ceased to exist over half a century ago. No surprise that it barely 
intrudes on their consciousness, unlike those in government (who are 
disproportionately wealthy and, in the case of the current incumbents, 
considerably more right-wing than the median voter). 
If one is looking for a “national myth” around which leave voters can 
coalesce, the British Empire is the wrong place. It is, instead, 
perceptions of the Second World War that shapes political 
consciousness. The myth here is a Britain that stands alone but 
refuses to buckle – assaulted on all sides by a more powerful and 
implacably hostile enemy. 
Few of the generation that actually experienced World War Two 
remain alive – those that voted grew up instead in its shadow. Beliefs 
are shaped not by lived experience but by what might best be termed 
propaganda. Little wonder that many reacted so strongly to the notion 
of control being “imposed” by a hostile “Europe”. Empire might not be 
referenced in common language (including around Brexit), but the 
“Blitz Spirit” certainly is. 
So how does this frame perceptions of what Brexit should actually 
mean? My own experience from interviewing leavers is that, far from 
beliefs that Britain should be particularly powerful or influential, the 
phrase that comes up most often is “we just want to be a ‘normal’ 
country”. This is difficult or impossible to square with alleged Empire 
nostalgia. 
Instead, it appears to have most in common with American 
isolationism. There is a desire for self-sufficiency and a wish to go 
one’s own way. Whether such a move is feasible or desirable in the 
modern world is another question entirely, but we cannot begin to 
address the issues raised by Brexit (and this is true for all of Europe) 
until we properly understand the impulses that drove people to vote 
for it. 
 
